More than $24 billion wonh of antidepressants and antipsychotic drugs were dispensed in 2008-almost a 48-fold increase since 1986 (Pringle, 2006; Elias, 2009) . Such expenditure would employ 240,000 psychotherapists earning an annual income of S I00.000 to provide 6 million hours of psychotherapy aver· aging 25 client-hours a week. These figures do not include what would be possible using the additional revenue generated by the sales of antianxiety. hypnotic, and psychostimulant medications.
How has the disease model for emotional disorders become the dominant discourse causing so many people to usc neurophanmlceuticals as the best defense against emotional and behavioral symptoms? The purpose of Ihis article is to ofTer an explanation, although not an absolute one. to account for how clienls come to accept the disease model of emotional distress and to ofTer suggestions for working with them.
Th"mas L Murray. Jr i., alJilill{(·d wilh Ihi' VIlI"t'I',I'ily of N() '", .<pmUIt'IIl"l' COIICertl/ll1t IIIIS arlicl, ' ., ·llOuld /><' ilddressed 10 nlOIIIIIS L, Murl'ily, Jr. "hD, Di, 'n'iCt'.'. Ulli\'('r<i~, . I. Psychiatry is part of a larger system, the psyehophannaceutical-industrial complex (PPIC), which is primarily driven by capitalism. 2. Power dynamics are inherent in thc doctor-consumer relationship. 3. The many subsystems of the PPIC arc motivatcd by good intentions, but their behavior and its consequences may not reflect the goodness of those intentions. 4. Under certain conditions consumers can adopt explanations for their diagnoses that make them impervious to other explanations in ways similar to cult indoctrination.
In using these assumptions to answcr the question, I will describe the PPIC, the parallel between the PPIC and cult-like phenomena, and how cult susceptibility factors mirror characteristics of psychiatric consumers. I conclude this paper with suggestions on how to reconstruct the loss of self that is a product of the PPIC.
Til E PSYCHOPHJ\ RMACEUTICAL·INDUSTRIAL C01\II 'LEX Duhl and Cummings (1987) identified the emergence ofa mental health complex that has parallcls with the military-industrial complex described by President Eisenhower (1960) and the medical-industrial complex identified by Rclman (1980) . Breggill (1991) used the teml psychophannaceutical complex to describe the economic influences therein. Though these authors provide important contributions to our understanding of the flow of resources alllong these entities. there has not been a comprehensive conceptualization to describe the process that involves our clients' interaction with the PPIC and the effects thereof.
The PPIC is a symbiotic system composed of the American Psychiatric Association (primarily administrative and research psychiatry), the phannaeeutical industry, public relations and advertising finns, patient support organizations (e.g.. the National Alliance on Mental Illness [NAMI] and Children and Adults with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder [CHADD] ), the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), managed care organizations, and the llow of resources and money among these groups.
To further understand the PPIC, a systcmic perspective provides a conceptual framework in which the focus is on II"h (l/ happened and hoII'. when . and where it happened, avoiding any preoccupation with \l'h) ' It happened (Bowen, 1978) . In other words. throughout this paper, I will address the processes involved in the PPIC, acknowledging that there arc no saints or sinners but that all parts arc interdependent entities motivated by survival needs (how to make a profit and Murray / !>SYCIlOl'flARMACEUT/('AJANDUSl'RIt\J, COMn, EX 185 how to make more profit---eapitalism). Procecding without blaming is especially important given the volatility and emotional intensity that the PPIC evokes. Therefore, as with all systems and their subsystems, a metaview provides a different perspective about how these parts become interdependent and speak a common language.
So that the PPIC can survive and thrive within a capitalistic society, the system has organized itself around a single simple assumption: mental disorders are a chronic condition resulting from a diseased brain that requires expert medical treatment in the foml of mass-produced phannaceuticals (Kuppin & Carpiano, 2006) . This belief system gives purpose to all parts of the system. Pharmaceutical companies develop a continuous flow of medications and proṽ ide funding to NIMH and patient support organizations like NAMI and CHADD, both of which rely on the phannaceutical industry for funding, directly and indirectly. In tum, NIMH and patient support organizations endorse the disease model and its effects (medication research and education).
Patient support organizations, with funding from the phannaceutical industry, lobby policy makers to fund psychiatric research through NIMH. The psychiatric establishment depends increasingly on the phannaceutical industry not only for education and promotional materials (continuing education credits, honorariums, lunches, frcc office supplies, and medication samples) but also for the flow of consumers who need medication evaluations and management for their "chronic disease." The phamlaceutical industry relies 011 academic psychiatrists to produce evidence that supports their medications. Academic psychiatry depends on the phamlaceutical industry for research grants, draws up treatment protocols, and sets the agenda for the psychiatric profession specifically and the mental health profession in gencral. Insurance companies rely on phanllaccuticals to contain costs (and limit psychotherapy scssions), and reimbursement depends on a diagnosis of a diseased brain. Figure I illustrates how this system operates. All thcse groups work to provide, in thcir vicw, vital scrvices for olle another, with the goal bcing improved mental health for cveryonc. As a capitalistic system with a drive toward greater profits, modem healthcare has evolved into a sickncss care system. For example, the currcnt dynamic is such that the PPIC makes more profit by keeping consumcrs in the system and stands to lose when consumcrs discontinue psychiatric medications. Thcre are, of course, consumers who enter and exit the mental health care system successfully and arc better because of it. However, my most difficult cases involve clients who have in csscnce been drawn into the PPIC and have bccomc resigned to the diseasc model with little sense of empowcnl1cnt to overcome their emotional problems. These are the consumers who have linle self-efficacy and linle hope that they have options othcr than to sufTer. And these are the cascs about which I want to know more. What is involved in their personal seduction into the complex? --
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pp. 147 1S9 COPYright ZOO 1 by Richard (l""kn Rqmnlcd" 1111 perllll,,,,,n CUl.l~L1 KE: 1'1-1 E.'l:O'\ ENA OF Til E: "PIC The inference that the pmctices and effccb of the PPIC resemble cull-like phenomcna produces a \ isceral reaction of outright rejcction m both profcssionals and laypersons. Nc\cnheless. c10scr e:<amination of the cult literature pro' ides a number of parallels wonh considcrlng-mosl notably_ how people become seduced by cults. West (1993) pro\ lded a psychiatric conceptualization for understanding the characteristics ofcults and the charactcrisucs thai cxplain cult-mcmbers' scduction and subscquclll indoctrination. West wrOle. "Undcr cenain kinds of stress or duress. indh lduals can bc made to comply with the demands of those in I>ower" (1993. p. I). I looked to this anicle to understand my clients' apparent resignation to the disease model of mental illncss so emphasized in mainstream lllld protcssiol1l11 arcnas. As West suggested, the question of power is par3mount in this investigation. Crossley (2004) positioned the power of the psychiatnc establishmcnt as being a symbolic po\\ er to dcfine, namc. categorize and diagnose: to locate particular types of menIal distress and dc\ ianec \\ ithin a mcdicalmodel of illness; and 10 cnsurc. on thIS basis. thai indl'idual.. failing withm thcse calegories are treatcd "appropriately," I rcturn, thcn. to \\''"~t (1993) 
for inslghl illlo a context
In \~hieh this IXmer ma111fcsts itself:
Cult (totalist typel: a group or movelllem exhibiting a great or exeessi,'C d"votion or dedication to somc perwn, idca, or thmg, and employing unethical. mampulatl\C. or coercive t«lmiques of persuasion and control (e ,g.. isolation from fonner friends and family. debilitmion. usc of spe' cial methods to hcighten suggestibility and~ubsef\icnce. rowerful group pressures. infonnatiun management. promotion of tota] dependency on the group and fear of leaving it. suspen~ion of indi 'iduality and critical judgment. etc. I. designed to advance the goals of the group's leaders. to the possible or actual detriments of members. their families. or the community (p. 8).
Using West's definition of cults as a framework for understanding thc PPIC and its impact on these difficult cases, I therefore examine (a) dedication to the disease model ofbchavioral disorders; (b) unethical. manipulative. or coercive techniques of persuasion and control; (c) dependency development and fear; and (d) the mcans by which the aforemcntioned tcchniqucs ultimately advance the agenda of the PPIC. Disea~'e1MedicalModel I propose that there are similarities betwcen cult-like phenomena of a devotion to an idea (West. (993) and the adoption of biological reductionism (the discasc model) by those within the psychiatric profession known as the New Psychiatry movement (Lccman, 2007; Lewis. 2006) and by others (c.g.. nonpsychiatric prescribers. mental hcalth professionals, and laypersons). Though the evolution of psychiatry over the last 130 years is beyond thc scopc of this paper. thcrc arc some aspects wonh noting. Most importantly. thc disease model can be viewed as bookending the story that is psychiatry.
Dedicatioll to the
The disease model was the foundation of early psychiatry: after aiL Sigmund Freud was a neurologist. Howcver. that model gavc way to the psychoanalytic tmdition throughout much of the twenticth ccmury. In fact. most psychiatrists wcrc trained in psychoanalysis as pan of their medical education. Concurrently. psychiatry bcgan facing an idcntity crisis. which provided momentum for a pendulum swing at mid-century (Andreason, 2006) . Rcscareh and administrative psychiatrists wanted to be viewed like their medical brethren and focus on identifying organic causes of psychopathology. The pressurc trickled down through the profession and, aeeording to Leeman (2007) , frontlinc physicians "were expccted to follow suit" (p. 182). This movement culminated with the third edition of the Diagnostic al/d St(/fistica/ Mal/ual (DSM-lll; American Psychiatric Association. 1980) . which was lauded as more scientific and athcoretical than its predecessors (Andreason. 2006; Lewis. 2006) . New Psychiatry providcd scientific cenainty about thc etiology of psychopathology find about thc lesser. if any. relevanee of soeiological and psychological factors (Andreason. 2006) .
Because uf New Psychiatry'S emphasis on the disease model, as wcll as the drive for professional parity with other medical specialties, the profession is easily seduced by all things claimed as scicnce (Lcwis. 2006) , cspccially when produced by members of the psychiatric establishment and used as a means to advance psychiatry. Thus, New Psychiatry has relied solely on the production and dissemination of medications to relieve human suffering (Wall, 2007) , giving little attention to nonpharmacological interventions. [n fact, disease model adherents rarely obtain continuing education about llonphamlacological interventions to help people resolve anxiety. suffering, :md grief (Lewis, 2006) . Psychiatric training programs have either dramatically decreased comprehensive psychotherapeutic education or discontinued it altogether (Drell, 2007) , probably driven by capitalistic forces (e.g., morc profit is made by providing medication evaluation and management Oil a IS-minute schedule) and the ccrtainty that cmotional disorders arc a function of a diseased brain.
Psychiatrist Bruce Lachter. after accepting the certainty offered by the New Psychiatry, recalled an experience offrustration while working with a man who had lillIe insight into his depression. Lachter wrote. "Such powerful knowledge of the facts of the brain gave tne just the certainty that this unfortunate patient lacked" (Lachter. 2001. p, 3 11) . Lewis (2006) suggested that such adherents of thc disease model are likely to (a) naturalize and rcify "mental illness""; (b) feed into the medicalization of deviance; (c) feed into psychiatry as an agent of normalization. statc control. and multicultural oppression; (d) feed into the pharmaceutical industry boondoggle; and (I) rest on a natural-science approach to humans that excludes other approaches and multiple approaches. With the certainty that comes with New Psychiatry and its contribution to the PPIC, the disease model allows for a number of approachcs to mental disorders that parallel the activities of cults. particularly tcchniqucs of indoctrination.
Persuasion Tec/JlIiqlle~' West (1993) 
Isola/ioll
Cults usc isolation to 111IllII11IZe influence from those outside the group who may contaminate the vulnerable beliefs of cult members and to increase dependency on cult leadcrs. Similarly. evidence suggests that some iatrogcnic isolation occurs as a result of the PPIC that has profound consequences for consumers.
The disease model can be quite detrimental for the psychiatric consumer, who becomes increasingly isolated due to the unintended increase in social stigma (Lam & Salkovskis. 2007; Lam. Salkovskis. & Warwick. 2005; Read & Harre, 2001 ). The adoption of New Psychiatry's disease model results in the general public believing that psychiatric consumers, who have a brain disease, arc dangerous and unpredictable (Read & Harre, 2001 ). In fact, Henman (2001) suggested that professionals and lay people arc more likely to believe that emotional problems arc incurable if they believe that the causes arc entirely biological. Such an assumption establishes that a greater authority (psychiatry) must intervene to provide safety and security. Consequelllly, consumers organize their life around their role as psychiatric consumer (Williams & Collins, 2002) with little hope of recovery.
Psychiatrists arc not immune to the isolationism that is a consequence of their adoption of the disease model. Like the general population they experience emotional distress within the prevailing social construction of the disease model; according to Balon (2007) , "a considerable number of psychiatrists would not [accept medication for} themselves for depression, possibly because of fear of stigma or fear of a pemlanent record" (p. 306). [n other words, a significant number of the psychiatrists Bolan surveyed would not seck psychiatric care personally for fear of the stigma attached to help-seeking.
Debitila/iOIl
Cults use all the tcchniques listed by West (1993) to emotionally, behaviorally, and socially debilitate members. By discmpowerillg their members, they have continuing significant influence over how the members function. Likewise, I assert, the PP[C has cult-like debilitating effects, particularly with regard to the locus of control and the debilitating effects of psychiatric medications.
People who believe that they eontroltheir own destiny have an intemallocus of control. It is generally understood that such people have greater health, success, and well-being (Marshall. 1991) . Similarly, an extemal loclls of eontrolthe belief that one has little control over one's circumstances---has been linked to psychopathology (Smith, Pryer, & Distefano, 1971) . One would assume that New Psychiatry would highly encourage an intemallocus of control. However, an intemallocus of control has been linked with poor insight into one's psychiatric diagnosis (Williams & Collins, 2002) . If consumers arc to be considered insightful, they must agree with the perception of the evaluator (Diesfeld & Sjostrom, 2007) . As applied in New Psychiatry, insight is qualified as the acceptance of a diseased brain abollt which the consumer has little independent control (i.e., an extemalloeus of control) and, by extension, for which medical intervention and authority is required.
Not only is PPIC unintentionally debilitating psychologically but. Breggill (2006) suggests, much dcbilitation results from the actual medications prescribed for psychiatric disorders because these suppress nonnal brain functioning. Breggill proposed that psychiatric consumers undergo a JOURNAL or MENTAL IIE~lLTII COUNSELING spellbinding effect-intoxication anosognosia from psychoactive medications. Anosognosia. a neuropsychological tenn. is the lack of awarcness of onc's dcficits (Adair. Schwartz. & Barrcll. 2003) . According to Breggin. intoxication anosogllosia cxplains thc pcrsistcncc that psychiatric consumers dcmonstratc when they continue psychiatric mcdications evcn whcn mcntal and bchavioral side cffeets become scvere and disabling. Mental health providers may bc most familiar with this phcnomcnon as part of substancc abusc trcatmcnt. As Moncricff (2007) wrotc. "In chronic alcoholism and other substancc dcpcndencics, it is also recognized that people deny the degree to which their substancc usc is adverscly affceting their functioning and their relationships'" (p 171). Relating this phenomenon to psychiatric mcdications, many consumcrs may not identify subtle blll equally serious side effects because of inadequate infonncd conscnt (Breggin & Cohcn. 1999) .
Breggin (1997) dctailed 11 brain-disabling principles in his book. Braill-disabling Trealmenls ill Ps)"chially. Four principles directly address the issue of mcdication-induccd debilitation: (a) all psychophannaccUlicals disrupt nonl1al brain function without improving brain function; (b) all psyehopharmaceutieals work by causing generalized brain dysfunction. afTecting both emotional and cognitive functioning; (c) psychophannaeeuticals '"help·· by impairing higher human functions. ineluding emotional responsiveness. social sensitivity. selfawarencss or self-insight. 'lutollomy. and self-determination: and (d) psychopharmaceuticals produce the same disabling clTcet on all pcoplc. with or without psychiatric diagnoses. Rcaders should note that Breggin's writings arc not widely acceptcd among psychophannacologists. Ncw Psychiatry adhcrcnts. and others who value the disease model as a IIseful lens through which to understand human suffering. Nevertheless. increasingly the literature seems 10 providc support for his principles (Jackson. 2005; Murray. 2006) .
Suhservience and Suggestihiliry Techniques
Cults portray membcrs as victims of the greater oppressive socicty and promise thcm respite through the eult indoctrination process. Moreover. members can devclop pscudoidentities if the only way to obtain relicf and understanding is 10 adopt the charaetcristics demanded (West 1993) . Similarly. Williams and Collins (2002) and McCay and colleagues (2006) arguc that psychiatric conSUTllers arc prone to engulfment: the lifestyle of a psychiatric conSUTller (and the related psychosocial interventions) result in consumers relinquishing signilieant personal authority to thc mcdical authority, a parallel to cult indoctrination. This process is facilitated whcn practitioners refer to consumcrs by their diagnoses (e.g.. "I-!c's bipolar/schizophrenic/OeD"), which conveys penllanency and limits thc prospect of hope and recovery.
Thc PPIC uses a number of suggestible techniques to furthcr thc diseasc model agenda. with each subsystem participating in its own way. For example.
Murray /I'SYCHOI."ARMACEU1'IC,\L-INOUS'I'RI,\L COMI'LEX
29/ Murray (2006) reviewed a number of ways psychiatric researchcrs suggest greater support and efficacy for psychiatric mcdications, including publishing thc samc rcsults in multi pic journals to give the appearance of more empirical support. Recently, thc drug maker Merck & Company gained considerable attention, although for a nonpsychiatry journal. for working with publisher Elsevier to distributc an industry-sponsored, non-pecr-reviewed journal that mirrored more reputable counterparts (Associated Press, 2009 ).
Other means arc especially pronounced when occurring within the context of consumers becoming dependent, as in cults, on their providers for meeting both physical and psychological necds if they arc to survive (West, 1993) . For example, there is a prevailing assumption. supported by minimal cvidcncc, that untreated psychosis damages the brain (Liebemlan, Sheilman. & Kinon. 1997; Wyatt, 1991) . which has led psychiatric practitioners to develop treatment compliance stratcgies.
Trealll1elll compliance. West (1993) defined brainwashing as "any procedure employed to induce compliant bchaviors" (I" 2). Thc PPlC cmphasizes medication compliance among psychiatric consumers. In fact, a number of theoretical and programmatic initiatives (e.g.. motivational interviewing) have becn uscd to pcrsuade eonsumcrs first to submit to psychiatric medication and then to stay on it (Fernandez. Evans, Griffiths, & Mostacchi, 2006; Ginsberg, 2006; Kavanagh, Duncan-McConnell, Grecnwood. Trivcdi. & Wykes, 2003; Riillsch & Corrigan, 2002) . For example. nurses are encouraged to work toward medication adhcrcncc and usc a varicty of mcthods for increasing compliancc (Fcrnandez et aL). Consumers may also bc told, "The reason you fcel sad all thc timc is bccausc you're not taking your medication:' as a means to pcrsuade a consumer to become compliant. This circular logic avoids any implication that mood may be the result of ncgative lifc experiences.
Other suggestibility tcchniques occur whcn prcseribcrs inform consumers that if the medication is discontinucd. the diseasc will rcturn. When consumers discontinuc the mcdication, thcy oftcn cxpcrience withdrawal symptoms that mimic symptoms similar to the diagnosis. thus creating a confirnlatory bias. They return to medication to alleviate the withdrawal symptoms, which reinforces beliefs in thc discasc modcl (Glel1nmullen, 2005) . These and similar approaches have the effect of invalidating the person's cxpericncc by discounting environmental contributions. Moreover. the assumption is that it is not neccssary to make changcs to the cnvironmcnt bccause medication is enough.
Howevcr, recovery may bc jeopardized when consumers cxpect too much from their medication. Basoglu. Marks. Kilil; , Brewin, and Swinson (1994) found thai consumers who attributcd thcir recovery to the powcr of the mcdication and felt less confidcnt of their ability to managc the symptoms wcre at greater risk orrclapse. Those who attributed improvemcnt to personal strcngth and rcsources expericnced fcwer relapses. Funhennorc. Biondi and Picardi 191 JOURNAl. Of" MENTAl. IIf; AI.TII COUNSELING (2003) found that consumers who predicted that remission and medication were related had higher relapse raiCS. and those who did not believe that the two wcrc linked did not relapse. In fact. nonc of tile participants who held the laller view relapsed after medication was discontinued \0 observe for the effect. Though the sample size was extremely small, the findings mise important treatment considerations. Biondi and Picardi (2003) wrote. "Working on patients' attributions with the aim of favoring a shift toward a more intcmal orientation is considered essential in the trealment of phobic patients" (p. [10). I would argue that morc research needs to examine this thoroughly in lenns of all psychiatric diagnoses for which medication is considered.
One final note about treatment compliance: A significant difference between cults and the cult-like phenomenon of the PPIC is that the latter suggests that consumers arc oppressed by their own defective biology (e.g., biochemical imbalances, gcnetie disorders, or pathophysiology of the brain; Murray, 2006; Wah1. 1999) , for which expert authority and treatment is needed. Cults, 011 the other hand, focus on the impact of an external oppressor. Thus, unlike cult members, psychiatric consumers can ncver find freedom from the oppressor, because the oppressor is within.
POlI'erfil1 Gmul) Pressures
Confonnity is a powerful process that molds the beliefs of individuals to reflect those of the group (Kassin, 1998) . Cults capitalize on this group process as well as being impacted by groupthillk (where members of a group convince themselves that their beliefs arc correct). Groupthink can suppress personal doubts without the person realizing that this is happening (Kassin). Finally, "group members harbor an illusion of invulnerability, an illusion of unanimity, and an exaggerated belief in the morality of their views" (Kassin, p. 50S). Likewise, the PPIC uses "science" 10 create a protective shield from critical examination of its fundamental assumptions llnd excludes anyone who lTlay express these criticisms (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992; Lewis, 2006}-particularly when the criticisms come from within the group (Caplan, 1995) , This ultimately leads to the appearance of unanimity. Those professionals who do not adopt the disease model arc kept from contributing to the discourse (Malik & Beutler. 2002) .
Group pressures also exist in other areas of the PPIC-rnost notably within patient support organizations. Typically these organizations, also known as advocacy coalitions. arc highly supportive of thc disease model of mental illness, which corresponds with many consumers' acceptance of the modelafter all, the PPIC oftcn uses the model to explain the etiology of symptoms (Crossley, 2004) . However, unbeknownst to most peoplc there is a symbiotic rclationship between the phannaecutieal industry and paticnt support organizations like the NAMI and CHADD (Ginsberg, 2006) . Many corporations arc instrumental in promoting these grassroots organizations for their perceived credibility among consumers (Beder, Gosden, & Mosher, 2003) . In fact, Rose (1991) wrote, "Any institution with a vested commercial inlerest in the OUl· come of an issue has a natural credibility barrier to overcome with the public, and often with the media" (p. 28). Once established, patient support organiza· tions like NAMI and CHADD get up to 91 percent of their funding from the phannaceutical indust!)' (Ginsberg) . This creates a powerful team advocating for simplistic biological explanations for mental disorders (Healy & Le Nou!) Smoyak, 2004) , as well as giving the appearance of widespread consen· sus. Those organizations that criticize the indust!)' or the disease model may experience a loss of indust!)' support (Ginsberg) . Any curso!)' examination of newsletters and brochures from these organizations yields ve!)' little evidence that consideration is given to plausible nondisease theories of etiology, Group pressures within the PPIC appear to influence what is or is not dis· closed to the public, Ginsberg's expose (2006) of various patient support orga· nizations found that they (a) rarely disclosed their tics with the phannaceutical indust!)', (b) were slow to educate their members about new concerns abolll medications typically used by their members but quick to publicize treatment "breakthroughs," and (c) rarely questioned drug prices. I contend that these influences naturally have an impact on consumer indoctrination. These rela· tionships have recently been the focus of inquiry by United States Senator Charles Grassley (Giles, 2009). Grassley recently requested that NAMI dis· close its financial tics with the pharnUleeutieal industry. The executive director, Michael Fitzpatrick, has since disclosed that 56% of NAMI's operating budget is supported by the industry. This is of great concern in part because NAMJ is now the largest purveyor of mental health educational programs in the US, which arc generally peer-directed and designed to educate consumers' families, service providers, service users, and community members (Burland & Nemec, 2007) , Much of patient education, publications, and other media is highly sup· portive oflhe phannaeeutical industry and the disease model; psychothempy is rarely promoted with any vigor.
Injormatio" Mallagemem
In addition to the infomlation management already mentioned, the PPIC also manages infonnation elsewhere. Because of the closed systems in which psychiatric infonnation is developed and disseminated (Beder, Gosden, & Mosher, 2003; Jackson, 2005; Murray, 2006) , medication infonnation is passed from the phannaceutical industry to psychiatric professionals. Not only is this infonnation in favor of the drug company (and disparaging about competitive brands), but few consumers arc given this (mis)infonnation through the conscnt process (Schachter & Kleinman, 2004) . Moreover, the phannaceutical industry is ve!)' secretive (Lexchin, 2007) ; it tends to release trial data only when they When such important information is suppressed, consent can never be fully infornlcd. As Geppert (2005) acknowledged, "Much of the consent we [psychiatrists] obtain from our patlcnts for pharmacotherapy is woefully uninformed" (I'. 55). "As an ethicist. 1review many charts and if they were Ihe only evidence available, we could never recreate even the outline of the doctrine of infomled consent" (I'. 56).
Not only can consumcrs be misinformed hlll information management and lack of informed consent call also result ill researchers misinterpreting data. For example. Kessing, Hansen. Dcmyllenacrc. and Bech (2005) asked participants about their perccptions ahout depression and antidepressants. The authors reported that the study's participants had a number of··erroneous·· beliefs about their psychiatric treatment, specitically antidepressant llsage. For example. 42.2% of the sample had the erroneous belief that discontinuing antidepressants was difficult if they had bcen taken for a long period. Murray (2006) found considerable evidence to support the beliefs ofthesc participants-antidcpressants arc associated with a discontinuation syndrome. Kessing and colleagues appeared to have had an a priori bias toward medication and were apparently unaware oflhe disconfirnling literature on psychopharmacology and thus concluded that accurate pcrceptions wcre crroneous.
Adl'eniscmelHs. Thc ('PIC includes public relations and advcrtising firms that market to the phannaeeutical industry. promoting how they can recruit potcntial Cllstomers (Bedcr, Gosdcn, & Mosher, 2003) . Ronit Ridberg (2006) produccd a documentary. Big Bllcks. Big Plwrma: Markelillg Disease & Pushing Dl"IIgs, which elucidated the relationships between the phannaccutical industry and advertising linns. Beder. Gosden, and Mosher, as well as Ridberg, explain that mass media work perfectly for the discase model by providing explanations for mcntal disorders using \irtual sound bites that promise quick fixes. If someone has a chcmical imbalance. thell l\ makes sense to usc a chcmieal to balance it.
Unlike traditional capitalism, wherc necessity was the mothcr of invention, within the PPJC invcntion is the mOl her of necessity. With the explosion ofncw diagnostic categories with each edition of thc DSM, thcre is a presumed need for more medications to trcat thcse disorders. Disease-mongering. a form of mass marketing, is the process of creating a need for a pharmaceutical product without demand for that product hiding its development (Dear & Webb. 2007; Ridberg, 2006) . [n short, phannaccutical production stimulatcs nccd through nlllSS advcrtising (Lewis, 2006) . Oncc thc dmg is prescribed, consumcrs may be encouragcd to take the drug prophylactically with no hopc of future rccovery (Hea [y, 2006) .
Tow! DepelldellLY alld Fear
Curtis and Curtis (1993) offered several observations about techniques cults use to ensure member reliance. Primarily, cult membcrs become "strongly conditioned by a powerful type of negative reinforccmcnt, namcly adhercnce to specific belicfs-no matter how irrational-serves to reduce painful affective states" (p. 457). Cults offer a "cure or anesthesia to emotional and physical pain" (p. 457). Many cult members arc reminded of the dangers to which they would be exposed if they left the cult. Thesc messages arc repeatcd regularly.
[t is the 'hreal of injury, rather than direct injury by the cult, that maintains a strong hold. It is as if the cult promises to alleviate pain and suffering now and in the future for as long as the member remains a part of the cult. 'This seems to involve a rather encompassing cognitive manipulation and stmeturing process in which previous attitudes. beliefs. and values arc radically transfonned to match those ofthcir captors" (p. 457).
The PPIC offers anesthesia for emotional and physical pain through psychiatric medications. Consumers arc routincly warned about the negative consequences of discontinuing a medication. They arc led 10 believe that their brains may suffer if they discontinue medication or that it will cause undue hardship on their families. Moreover. if they stop taking the medication, the disease will return. Ironically, the withdrawal syndrome that is associated with psydiatric medications is often confused with a retum of the original symptoms (e.g., depression). Breggin (2006) also wamed that consumers can begin to feci worse after starting medication but identify the side effects as signs of a dcclil1ĩ ng mental condition.
Ad.'OI1C;lIg the PsyL'llOphttrmuccuticu/-lmlllsrriul Complex
The primary mission of a cult is sci f-perpetuation (Enroth. 1977) . A similar argulllent can be madc about the PP[C. The PPIC must adhere 10 the disease model as a function of survival, whieh inl1uences how model proponents explain conSUlller symptoms, which in turn inl1uences how consumers explain symptoms to those around thcm (Lam, Sfllkovskis, & Warwick, 2005) . Moreover. as consumers arc bombardcd with diseasc model messages through television, magazines, and phanna-sponsorcd promotional materials, "these various advertising tools work to ereatc a samencss and repctition in the minds of psychiatrists and thcir consumers. The generalized mcssage is, . Psychiatrists give you dmgs, and that is good'" (Lewis, 2006. p. 57) . Of course, it must be noted that most psychiatric medications arc prescribed not by psychiatrists but 196 JOURNAL OF MENTAL IlEAI.TII COUNSELING by other medical doctors, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants (Whitaker, 2007) .
Not only does the phannacculical industry shape the discourse about mental disorders, but the American Psychiatric Association Press is a major gatekeeper of materials that advance the PPIC, as well as constraining opposing views and ultimately conveying that there is a broad consensus about the disease model (Lewis, 2006 
408-409).
Finally, unparalleled secrecy and conflicts of interest continue with regard to the next edition of the DSM, which is schedulcd for release in 2012. Spitzer (2009) Regarding the task force participants, Cosgrove and Bursztajn (2009) found that 68% report direct phamlaeeutical industry tics. Given that diagnosis infomls treatment decisions for most mental health professionals, these conflicts of interests arc of great concern.
SUSCEPTIBI L1TY TO TU E PSYCIWPIIAR~IACEUTICAl·INDUSTRIAL
COi\'IPlEX
If the PPIC's devotion to the disease model uses a number of persuasion techniques to foster its messages, what detennines the susceptibility to the messages of those on the receiving end of those techniques? And how does this result in consumers who lose their identities (Czuchta & Johnson, 1998) and accept the messages offered by the PPIC? In this section, I review six factors that Curtis and Curtis (1993) implicated in cult susceptibility. For each I draw parallcls with the psychiatric consumer.
Generalized ego-weakness al/d emutiul/al lIulnerability. Galanter (1989) stated that people generally join cults to relieve neurotic distress, obtain contentment, or as rcspitc from perceived social oppression and its intolerable consequences. As a rule, emotional distress is the impetus for psychiatric consumers to seek help. They feel little self-efficacy for managing the problem with their own resources. Not only do psychiatric consumers seck help while vOUSTRIAL COM1'1.EX '" feeling emOlionally vulnerable but neuroleptic medications may exacerbate emotional vulnerability through a process called "neuroleptic dysphoria" (Ballard, Basso, Gallagher. et al., 2007; Gerlach & Larsen, 1999) . Jackson (personal communication. March 10.2009 ) believes that this dysphoria also occurs with anxiolytics and some antidepressants by boosting "Y-(gamma) aminobutyric acid (GABA) levels and GABA transmission. as well as blunting dopamine. Cults (Curtis & Curtis, 1993) and the mental health establishment (Levilt, Butler, & Hill, 2006) respond to these periods of ego weakness and emotional vulnerability by offering security, protection, and belonging.
Suspension ojcritical thillki"g. Cults create an atmosphere in which vulnerable members surrender critical thinking in favor of the psychological relief that cult indoctrination promises. The propensity to do so makes it more dim· cult for people to critically examine the cult·s presumptive benefits because their rational judgment is suspended (Curtis & Curtis, 1993) . Similarly, psychi. atric consumers unknowingly accept the misleading and deceptive promises inherent in the presumptive benefits of the disease mode\. especially when such information is delivered by somcone with presumed authority (a la Stanley Milgram's obedience to authority experiments, 1%3. 1965). For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that psychiatric consumers rarely criticize the chemical imbalance theory despite not having their chemicals measured, as would be done with diabetes, to verify that there is indeed a brain imbalance. Furthermore, suspension of critical thinking may increase the likelihood for engulfment described earlier (see Williams & Collins, 2002) .
I"adequateJamily alld social support systems. Cult members experiencc tcnuous. deteriomted. or nonexistent family relations and social support systems, which contribute to their feeling ·'worthless. isolated, disoriented, helpless, and perhaps terrified" (Curtis & Curtis. 1993. p. 454) . Inadequate family and social support increases adherence to the cult by offering amelioration of these feelings and rescue from feelings of abandonment and rejection. Members of cults are also expcrted to relinquish thcir idcntity to the leader. which makes them "disoriented, helpless, and out of control" (Curtis & Curtis, p. 458). Cults isolate members from outside sources of information and instead repeat factually incorrect information to furthcr strengthen indoctrination.
Inadequate family and social support systems have long been linked to emotional disorders, just as strong family and social support has been linked to mental health (Murray, 2005) . Psychiatric consumers seck care to relieve emotional pain by being accepted and understood. However, consumers may actually experience increased stigmatization and isolation (Lam & Salkovskis. 2007 . Psychiatric consumers afC routinely lold Ihal thelf \cry survival depends on their compliance with mc<hcal;on (Healy. 1006). A consumer who suggests no longer needing mcdicaI;on or is rcady to decrease lhe dosage is looked upon \\ ith skepticism and alano by thc family or prescriber. In most clements of psychology. Ihis c\idcncc of an inlcrnallocus of control is viewed as a \ Ital aspect of mental health: ho\\e\er. \~ithill the psychl:l1ric literature. an inlemal locus of control is linked \\ ith "poor insight"" and medication noncompliance (Kampman et al.. 2002; Voils. Stcffens. Flint. & Bosworth. 2005; Williams & Collins. 2002) . The PP[C may inadvertently e;luse more helplessness among consumers through the usc of cenain mcdications (Ballard et 'II.. 2007) .
UI/II/al/ageable alld debilitating .\"I·lI/oliol/ol .\"lr(;'s.~(I//(/ ("I";.I"e.\". Cults olTcr "immcdiate relief through llIopian promises" (Cunis & Curtis. 1993. p. 456). People arc most vulnerable to the offerings of cults during times of strcss and crisis. "[t seems logical that individuals suffering from inordinme strcss scek out a varicty of quick fi.'(cs. and will be II1crcasingly \'ulnemble to the sl,."ductivc promlSCs offercd by cults" (CUl1is & CurtiS. p. 456).
Thc PPIC promotes two messages: (a) medications can make one happier. and (b) suffenng is uselcss and thereforc should be avoided. llistorically. psychiatric medications wcre used only for thc truly debilitated (O·l3arr. 2007). Now. the phannaccutical industry markets and health care prO\ lden; prescribe psychiatnc medications as quick fixcs (Whitaker. 2007) . "cmotlOnal bnghteners:' or a mcans to tolerate oppressl\c relatIOnships or li\ing conditions (Dworklll. 2006; Lexchin. 2006 ) III short. for many. psychiatric mcdications ha\c Ix-come "Iifestylc drugs:' Imolemh!l''Wcioecollomic ("ofuliflOl/I·. Those who expencnce desperate socioeconomic conditions are more, ulncrable to culls as all opportunity to cxperience rclicf from their situation because they offer practical solutions for sunival (iloffer. 1966 . as cited in Curtis & Curtis. 1993). Lewis (2006) identified three major groups who make up the bulk of psychiatric cOllsumers: women. the poor. and minoritics. Despitc New Psychiatry's almostllollexistcnt acknowlcdgemcl1t of the socioeconomic oppression these groups cndure. cxperienccs of oppression propel the natural inclination to seek relief (Kiesler. 1999; Lcwis. 2(06) . Howcvcr. WlIlokur and Clayton wrote. "We [psychiatrists) arc not intercsted in the 'psyche.' We arc interested in specific psychiatric illnesses" (1986. pp. ix-.'(). Such pcrspcclI\es may lead to prescriblllg for symptoms that arc better scned by iTllcrvcll1ng al thc sociclallcvel (Kiesler. 19(9) .
DcspllC e" Psyehiatry's 19nomllee of SOCiOCCOIlOlnlC '-ariablcs. these factors do influence menial health and medication usage. This is especially disconcerting when it eomcs to our most \'ulnerable population--children. For e'tample. foster children and children of low socioeconomic stalUs ha\e an extremely high rate of psychiatric drug consumption (Bro\\nell. Mayer. & Chateau. 2006) . In Oregon 300, of children in foster care are on psychiatric medIcations compared to 6'·. of childrcn outsidc of foster care (Associated Press. 2007) . lagnado (2007) speculated that the phannaceuticalmdustry markets dircctly to the poor and elderly because services are p.1id for by federal and !>tatc go"emments through Medicaid and Medicare. This indiscnmmant usc of psychiatric medications on our most \'ulnerable populations-children. elderly. minorities. and women-may make this a fundamental issue requiring greater allentionto those who advocate for social justice.
EXITING t'RO;\l TIlE l'l'le AND REDISCOVERING SELF
If the parallels between cults tlild the PPIC arc rcal. then as West (1993) wrote. "At any given lime most of their members are either not yet aW;lre lhat Ihey arc being exploited or. having come 10 realize it. lhey are unable to express such awareness because of fear. uncertainty. shame. or impainnent of will" (p. 17). Therefore. mental health counselors (MHCs) who work wilh clients resigned to the disease modcl must de"c1op strategies to expand client awareness. In this section. I identify deeonditioning strategies recommended by cult experts and mental health professionals.
CurtIS ( C.o;uchta and Johnson (1998) also encouraged mental health profeSSIonals 10 remind consumers thaI (a) reeo\ery is not only possible but docs occur, and (b) mcntal disordcrs arc a loss of self for which the recovery process includes lhe rediscovery of self. Strauss (1994) believes that this process has four b;lsic aspects: (I) discovering the possibility of possessing a more aClive sense of self. (2) taking stock of the strengths and weaknesses of thi~self and a~scssing possibilities for change. (3) pUlling into action some aspects of the self and intcgr.ning lhe results. and (4) u~ing the cnhanced sense of self 10 pro\ ide some degree of refuge from the illness (as cited in Czuchta & Johnson).
MHCs are also ad\ ised to educate themsehcs on psychophamlacology and 300 JOURNAL Of' MENTA/~IIEALTII COUNSELING the ethics thereof (Murray, 2006; Murray & Murray, 2007) as a means to offer support, encouragement, and education to consumers who have had negative experiences with psychiatric trealmenl. HappelL Manias. and Roper (2004) described a number of these experiences. which included (a) feeling frustrated that there was no indication of the length of time that medication was necessary, thus decreasing the amount of controllhcy felt over their hcalthcarc; (b) psychiatrists prescribing medications under false pretenses and later becoming angry after learning more aboullhc medication; (e) hcalthcarc providers being 1110rc interested in medication compliance than observing for and asking questions about side effects; (d) feeling blamed if their symptoms did not improve, and that healthcare providers did not question treatment appropriateness: (c) healthcare providers, panicularly in inpaticnt settings, ignoring the consumer's interest in nonphamlacologieal treatments and emphasizing medication stabilization: and (f) their opinions and requests for infomlation being "frequently dismissed as symptomatic of mental illncss rather than the legitimate claim for knowledge" (p. 247). If consumers present with these or similar experiences. MHCs arc advised to proceed using the recommcndations of Cunis (1982) described above.
IMPLICATIONS ,"'OR MENTAL IIJ::ALTII PROFESSIONALS
The major implications of the issues discussed for MIICs involve (a) rccxamining thc role of the disease model withinmcntal healthcare, (b) advocating for recovery model approaches as an effective therapy. and (c) addressing misleading or deceptive proclamations within mainstream media.
The mental health profession's commitment to the diseasc modeL and by extension the PPIC, has hurt the profession and those we serve. (incidentally. psychiatry is the only medical profession with a substantial opposition movement led by psychiatric survivors [Lewis, 2006] ). Yet the disease model docs have some merit. Psychiatrists, who have expertise in medical conditions, possess the necessary skills to screen for the lTlany conditions that can aOect mcntal health (e.g., infections, intracranial stmctural defects, endocrinopathies. hypoxia-ischemia, dcmyelinating disease. autoimmune disease. metabolic abnonnalities. dietary abnomlalities, or exposure to neurotoxins).
Moreover, psychiatrists and MHCs arc in a unique position to advocate for public mental health and illness prevention (Glasser. 2005; Kieslcr, 1999; Sowers & Thompson. 2007 ). For example, psychiatry must draw up a research agenda to hclp consumers recover from the damage done by neuropharmaceuticals; curremly. there is no infrastmcturc within mainstream medical practice that otTers support for discontinuing medication, recovering from its damaging etTects, and recovering without medication (Jackson. 2007. personal cOlTlmunication; Sower & Thompson. 2007 ). The American Association for Community Psychiatrists (httpJlwww.eomm.psych.pitt.edul) oITers a number of areas (leadership, training, and advocacy) in which psychiatry can rehabilitate the profession. MHCs can also take the lead in rehabilitating our profession in similar ways.
Leadership. To my knowledge. no major mental health professional organization (e.g.. American Counseling Association, American Psychological Association. ational Association of Social Workers. American Mental Health Counselors Association. American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy. and. of course. American Psychiatric Association) has spoken out against the reduetionist, monocausal disease model and more forcefully advocated psychotherapy. I press upon thc leadership of the counscling profcssion to lead the way. We have a great heritage grounded in our recognition that behavioral problems arc best understood within the context of culture and relationships rather than the belief that clients arc flawed by some genetic anomaly or I1curodefonnity-especially when neither has been shown to exist.
Training. Counselor education training programs must reconsider how we teach issues of psychopathology and psychophannacology to current students and practicing counselors. Rather than organizing training content solely by DSM nosology. such courses should also provide students with content critical of New Psychiatry (e.g., readings that question the validity and reliability of psychiatric diagnoses. critique the biological etiology. and critique the use of psychiatric medications). However. counselors arc best served when they have comprehensive training in behavioral neuroscience, including psyehophannacology. and research methodologies. Such training is necessary 10 a professional"s abilily to speak the prevailing language while critically analyzing the data. which may help counselors to ofTer clients conceptual ahemalives.
AdlYxacy. MHCs arc encouraged to examine how best to advocate for the profession by emphasizing the unique contributions we have to ofTer to our clients and community. To do so may mean shedding our allegiance to the status quo and thinking creatively. Our inability to "provide an equally simple and compelling counter idea" (Leeman. 2007. p. 184) has only contributed to our collusion wilh the PPIC by (a) minimizing collaboration with one another. and (b) accepting money from the phannaeeutical industry to sponsor professional conferences or to advertise in their publications with little regard for accuracy.
Instcad. MHCs arc invited to advocate for an ernpOWenllelll model thaI emphasizes recovery as possible and expected for even the most serious psychiatric disabilities. The National Empowerment Center (NEC: www.powcr2u.org). partially funded by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). has recommended its PACE program: Personal Assistance in Community Existence. The PACE program was constructed in part by examining the heroic accounts of others who have recovered from psychiatric disabilities. These individuals identified key clements in thcir recovcry. such as (a) having someone around who believed in their recovery and in them: (b) IHlving someone who projected hope: (c) having someonc provide a relationship in which they could lecl safe and trusted; (d) having a counsclor who was "able to be human:' which ineluded being open to correction; and (c) leaming skills in self-care, forgivcness. taking responsibility, and sctting goals.
All these arc skills at which MIiCs arc adcpt. It is precisely our ability to understand our elicnts' symptoms psychologically that Icads to our successes. Therapists who hold a psychological view have been found to be more effective than those who hold a medical view (Blatt, Sanislow. Zurofl'. & Pilkonis, 1996) .
Another area where MHCs can advocate for thc profession and their clients is by addressing misleading or deceptive proelamations about the etiology of mental disorders within mainstream media. Leo and Lacasse (2007) found that mcdia outlets continue to promote the disease model with little investigative reporting on the merits of disease model assulTlptions. M1-ICs are encouraged to write leiters to newspaper editors and other media outlets about the misleading infercnces that mental disorders are a product of a diseased brain. Finally. MHCs are encoumged to write articles for local newspapers and other publications that promote psyehothempy and the muhicausal view ofmcntal disorders.
The latler view acknowledges that complex intcractions of psychological. social. and biological factors influence the dcvelopmcnt of emotional problems. Too oftcn. howcvcr. wc emphasizc one ovcr the othcr-particularly biological considcmtions. Bccause humans arc biological crcatures. all of our expcrienees arc a function of chcmical and electrical proeesscs in our brains. However. this should not be intcrpretcd to mcan that our cmotional problems arc a product of somc biological disease, dcfieit. disorder. or dysfunction: thcy Illay mcrely bc understandable reactions to dillicult lifc situations. As with <lny system, when there is an intervcntion in any part of the system. the other parts respond accordingly. For example. psychotherapy. like all forms of hUllllln interaction. has a direct impact on our biology. including ncural plasticity, and our social rclationships (Fishbanc. 2007 : Siegel. 2006 .
Ultimately. consumers must be given a diversity of infonllatiol1 to become fully informed about their treatment options.
CONCLUSION
Although many consumcrs cnter ,md exit the psychiatric system without any delcterious cflects. too many lose their idcntity in thc process. Once inside, these conSUlllers are confronted with infOIll1lLtioll that C,ll1not be independently verified but that must be accepted in ordcr to reccive carc. and a new identity must be adopted. Despitc bcing told they have a chemical imbalance. like dia-
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betes. or a genetic defecl. no biological teslS are offered as evidence: nor can consumers prove the disease does not exisl. Nevertheless. the consumer is encouraged to try a number of medication cocktails to find the right one. No one suggests that difficulty in finding the right combination may be evidence that there is no biological abnomlality. The search for the right medication continues until the symptoms meet the expectation of the prescriber. Thus praise is gi' en to the superiority of the medication rather than thc courage of the consumer. Rarely. however. do the symptoms abate forever; thus the cycle begins anew. The cycle is organized around the disease model espoused by the PPIC. Vulnerable consumers become indoctrinated in ways similar to cults where "the {consulller}. having 10 seck definition as acutely sick and helpless in order to achieve a measure of public validation for his illness ... submerge[sJ himself in the sick definition pemlanently" (Erikson, 1957. p. 271 ).
The disease model has failed the mental health consumer by eliminating hope for recovery and increasing soci:!l stigma. isolation, and fear. Hill and Bale's (1981) remarks arc slill relevant today:
NOI only has the attempt 10 have the public vicw deviant behavior as symptomatic of illness failed. but the premise that such a view would increase public acceptance of the person engaging in such behavior seems to have been a dubious one to begin with. The notion Ihat psychological problems are similar to physical ailments creates the image of some phenomenon o,er which arnicted individuals have no cOlllrol and thereby renders their behavior apparently unpredictable (pp. 289 290).
The process of instilling hope of relief from emotional pain and the concept that suffering is not inherently pcmlanent is something importanl MIICs can ofTer (Abramson. Mctalsky. & Alloy. 1989 : Czuchta & Johnson. 1998 ).
However. they may find it difficult to instill hope when working with diems who have become resigned to Ihe disease modeL MHCs arc called upon nOI to collude with the PPIC but instead to offer hope thai recovery is possible by advocating for and eliciting personal resilience and empo\\cnnenl. To do this. they must advocate for their profession and develop psychologically relevant ways to help clients expand their awareness of the nature of their emolions and behaviors by rediscovering sci f and exiting the PPlC.
